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Comparative valuation of different policy interventions often requires interpersonal6
comparability of benefit. In the field of health economics, the metric commonly used7
for such comparison, quality adjusted life years (QALYs) gained, has been criticized8
for failing to respect the equality of all persons’ intrinsic worth, including particularly9
those with disabilities. A methodology is proposed that interprets ‘full quality of life’10
as the best health prospect that is achievable for the particular individual within11
the relevant budget constraint. This calibration is challenging both conceptually and12
operationally as it shifts dramatically when technology or budget developments alter13
what can be achieved for incapacitated individuals. The proposal nevertheless ensures14
that the maximal achievable satisfaction of one person’s preferences can carry no more15
intrinsic value than that of another. This approach, which can be applied to other domains16
of social valuation, thus prevents implicit discrimination against the elderly and those17
with irremediable incapacities.18
INTRODUCTION19
Current practice in health economics in measuring intervention effec-20
tiveness compromises equality by using an absolute standard of full21
health to which many cannot aspire. The challenge, set out in section I,22
is to define an alternative metric that is flexible enough that it can23
be used to compare treatment outcomes across individuals with very24
different capacities to benefit. Section II proposes a solution involving25
calibration of gains to individuals’ own maximal potential health26
prospect. In section III, the adequacy of the QALY under the proposed27
calibration to its role in social decision-making is assessed, in particular28
the requirement of homogeneity of intrinsic social value. Section IV29
considers the practical implications and applicability of this approach30
to the assessment of health treatments in a way that respects equality.31
I. THE EQUITY CHALLENGE32
There is widespread consensus in the practice of health economics that33
allocative decisions can usefully be supported by cost-utility analysis,34
and that the quality adjusted life year (QALY) is an appropriate unit35
of health-related utility. To the extent that it represents an accurate36
measure of social value, the QALY enables fair comparison of the37
effectiveness of different interventions in a range of contexts, including38
the promotion of health, the prevention of illness and accident, the39
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cure and the palliation of ill-health. Its use acknowledges that health40
benefits can involve either extending life expectancy or enhancing41
quality of life or both, and that beneficiaries rationally trade these42
different aspects of health benefit.43
In this methodology, the concept of quality of life is implicitly defined44
by the method used to elicit substitution rates between quality of life45
and its duration. The QALY gain or loss from an intervention for a46
representative patient is estimated through two distinct steps:47
i. Health Prospect Description. The patient’s health prospect in the48
absence of intervention is described, where a health prospect is49
the array of prospective health states with their probabilities of50
occurrence, and health states are characterized using a standard51
tool, such as the EuroQoL-5D. The EuroQoL-5D describes52
health states using five dimensions of health related quality53
of life: Mobility, Self-care capability, Ability to carry out usual54
activities, Pain/discomfort, Anxiety/depression. A health state is55
described by assessing whether it involves ‘no’, ‘mild/moderate’56
or ‘severe/extreme’ problems on each of the five dimensions. (See57
<www.euroqol.org/>). Similarly, the patient’s health prospect58
with the intervention is described. An intervention’s effect is to59
move the patient from one health prospect to another.60
ii. Health State Scoring. Each relevant health state is given a61
Health Related Quality of Life (HRQoL) score relative to full62
health, where full health is assigned a value of 1, and states63
equivalent to being dead are assigned a score of 0.64
Taking account of duration and probability of each state in the array65
of states in the health prospects faced by an individual respectively66
with and without the intervention, the number of QALYs promised by67
an intervention can be derived. (Thus, a sure life extension of one year68
in full health generates 1 QALY, as does a certainty of raising someone69
in a health state with HRQoL = 0.5 to full health for two years.)70
The assignment of different health states to HRQoL levels, step ii,71
is generally derived from a representative sample of members of the72
general public. It is here that the challenge to equality of human worth73
arises.74
To assign aHRQoL to a specific health state, the sample of the general75
public is asked to respond as if they were in that state either to the76
question77
What risk of death they would accept to achieve full health (this78
being the Standard Gamble, SG, elicitation technique)79
or to the question80
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What proportion of their imagined expected life-term (usually81
standardized for the exercise at ten years) would they forego in order82
to achieve full health (this being the Time Trade Off, TTO, elicitation83
technique).84
The problem lies with the implicit interpretation of ‘full health’.85
With a sample drawn from the general public, ‘full health’ is likely86
to be interpreted as full psychophysical function. This is problematic87
when applied to interventions that might benefit those with permanent88
irremediable disabilities. So measured, the maximum possible health89
gains for such patients, from interventions that necessarily only90
partially mitigate disability or that extend life without addressing91
disability, will fall short of what can be gained by those without92
disability. Their health is capped at a level that will receive a HRQoL93
score of less than 1; for thus are such disabled states scored by the94
general public. Hence life extensions or best-possible cures for illnesses95
for the disabled will be assigned fewer QALYs and thus less social value96
than corresponding gains for the able-bodied.97
The practice of health economics often appears to assume that in98
the QALY we have a measure of a social good – health gain – that is99
clearly of uniform intrinsic social value. (Intrinsic in contradistinction100
to any extrinsic value that the health of an individualmay bear, positive101
or negative, for example in enhancing tax receipts, or in mitigating102
inequality.) However, as currently calculated, the QALY is akin to a103
physical measure of health gain; to turn it into one appropriate for104
social valuation requires consideration of what contribution different105
health improvements make to what is of intrinsic social value. This106
issue is considered further in section III; it plausibly makes reference107
to individuals’ own rational aspirations for their lives (their welfare).108
If that is right, use of average valuation is problematic.109
The problem lies in the transfer of the valuation of a gain elicited from110
one population group (the representative sample) to other groups (the111
individual patients who will be the beneficiaries of the intervention).112
Whilst benefit transfer, a common and very useful technique113
in normative economics, inevitably ignores much heterogeneity,114
systematic bias should be avoided. Transferring valuations from a115
representative cross-section of the population for use in valuing benefits116
for an irremediably disabled sub-section, involves systematic bias.117
That use of standardized valuations to assess interventions for the118
permanently disabled in health technology appraisal is problematic has119
been widely recognized. And this critique has been used to discredit120
cost-utility appraisals. An article in The Lancet put it thus:121
The QALY outcomemeasure has problems. Even if a life-year in which a person122
has impaired mobility is worse than a healthy life-year, someone adapted to123
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wheelchair use might reasonably value an additional life-year in a wheelchair124
as much as a non-disabled person would value an additional life-year without125
disability. Allocators have struggled with this issue.1126
Within the health economics literature, the problem has generated a127
strand of analysis and various proposals. No such proposal has yet128
found its way into general practice of health technology appraisal,129
which therefore remains vulnerable to the claim of systematic bias130
against the disabled.131
The most straightforward proposal was offered by Eric Nord with132
colleagues:133
[F]or states of chronic illness or disability that are preferred to death, all saved134
life years count as one.2135
To resolve the issue, we have suggested that all life years gained by disabled136
people should count as 1 . . . 3137
This proposal, which is termed by its authors the ‘equal value of138
life approach’ (EVL), is however only a partial solution, as it does not139
address the valuation of an intervention somewhat to raise the quality140
but not to extend the years of someone with a permanent disability.141
Once we decide to accord equal value to the life of the disabled, it142
becomes appropriate to assign full value to the maximal functional143
state of someone with a permanent disability and to value functional144
recovery to that state following an illness as full recovery.145
Hence, to make the use of a QALY metric acceptable, an alternative146
understanding of Health Related Quality of Life is required, one147
that does not implicitly rate the lives of those with less than perfect148
psychophysical functional ability as inferior.149
The challenge is complicated by the fact that those with disabilities150
are often stuck in health states from which others can gain from151
treatments; indeed, it is for the appraisal of such treatments that the152
HRQoL and QALY methodology is designed. Further, even those with153
disabilities that are currently untreatable could gain from conceivable154
treatments. From this perspective the apparent full recovery for the155
permanently disabled is not after all a truly full recovery.156
1 Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer and Ezekiel J Emanuel, ‘Principles for Allocation
of Scarce Medical Interventions’, The Lancet, vol. 373, issue 9661, 31 January 2009,
pp. 423–31, at 427
2 E. Nord, J. L. Pinto, J. Richardson, P. Menzel and P. Ubel, ‘Incorporating Concerns
for Fairness in Numerical Valuation Of Health Programmes’, Health Economics 8 (1999),
pp. 25–39, at 36.
3 E. Nord, P. Menzel and J. Richardson, ‘The Value Of Life: Individual Preferences
and Social Choice: A Comment to Magnus Johannesson’, Health Economics 12 (2003),
pp. 873–7, at 873.
Calibrating QALYs to Respect Equality 5
This creates a dilemma in assignment of states to HRQoL: to respect157
equality, we must accord all lives full worth; yet to motivate cure for158
those with temporary disability, and to motivate the search for cure for159
those with apparently permanent disability, we must recognize that160
some health states are less good than others.161
∗ ∗ ∗162
Before developing a technical solution to this problem in section II – one163
which admittedly involves a degree of conceptual acrobatics –we should164
address three alternative approaches that might be thought to dissolve165
the problem: Dworkin’s proposal to select the basket of health treat-166
ments through a hypothetical health insurance optimization; use of167
equity weights to increase the valuation of treatments that benefit the168
disabled; and adversion to elicited societal preferences regarding valu-169
ation of interventions benefiting the disabled. Consider each in turn.170
Suppose that health treatment appraisal is conceived from the171
perspective of a healthy individual maximizing her potential welfare172
in the face of a set of risks, and wishes to select the optimum basket173
of health services so to do. Use of an absolute scale of psychophysical174
function to appraise different treatments is in such a case appropriate175
as no interpersonal comparisons are involved. Compare for example176
a treatment that would give fourteen healthy years following a heart177
attack and another treatment that would yield fifteen traumatic years178
under treatment for cancer.4 If the risk of heart attack and the risk179
of cancer are similar, and the pain and suffering attending the cancer180
cure are unpleasant enough, it would be rational for someone to choose181
to include the heart treatment rather than the cancer treatment in182
the portfolio of treatments (assuming that she cannot afford both).183
There is no required judgement of the relative value of the life184
years of two different persons, respectively with cancer and heart185
disease: for the comparison here is of the possible outcomes for one186
individual.187
In his ‘Justice in the Distribution of Health Care’, Ronald Dworkin188
proposes the use of a thought experiment of this kind, in which a189
society with an equitable distribution of resources chooses what basket190
of health care services it should fund, as a guide to the basket of services191
that should now be funded publicly (or mandated for social insurance192
funding). He argues that193
[W]e should aim to make collective, social decisions about the quantity and194
distribution of health care so as to match, as closely as possible, the decisions195
4 I am grateful to Richard Cookson for the challenge presented by this example, which
is picked up again at the end of section III.
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that people in the community would make for themselves, one by one, in the196
appropriate circumstances, if they were looking from youth down the course of197
their lives and trying to decide what risks were worth running in return for198
not running other kinds of risks.5199
Dworkin stipulates that for the experiment to work in guiding200
community choices, you must201
[I]magine that no one in your community – including insurance companies – has202
any information available about the antecedent probability of any particular203
person contracting any particular disease or infirmity that he or she does204
not evidently already have. No one would be in a position to say, of himself205
or anyone else, that that person is more or less likely to contract sickle-cell206
anemia, or diabetes, or to be the victim of violence in the street, than any other207
person.6208
It might be argued that the selection of treatments within a budget209
constraint so as to maximizemaximize expected QALYs calibrated210
relative to full psychophysical function is precisely what one would211
expect of someone ignorant of their particular set of health needs.212
Dworkin argues that nothing that that hypothetical society would do,213
‘by way of health care arrangements, is open to objection on grounds214
of justice’ and ‘what they would do through independent decisions can215
serve as a guide to what we should do, in whatever way we can, to216
improve justice in our own circumstances’.7217
However, Dworkin himself excludes from the ignorance stipulation218
to which his hypothetical purchaser of health insurance is subject only219
risk of ‘disease or infirmity that he or she does not evidently already220
have’. Hence, in drawing lessons from the hypothetical choices, we will221
still have to confront the challenge of designing a basket of services222
that would fit the choices of those with existing permanent disabilities223
as well as those who have none.224
Dworkin does not spell out the rationale for thus suggesting that225
the disabled should choose with knowledge of their disability, but226
presumably it is that those who are actually disabled could otherwise227
deny the relevance of the thought experiment: they are not in a position228
to choose a basket of services that would have mitigated the risk of or229
the consequences of the disability from which they suffer, so it is unjust230
to insist that they respect the decisions that they might have made had231
they been in such a circumstance. If the community is to act on their232
behalf it must recognize that their conception of full health differs from233
that of others.234
5 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Justice in the Distribution of Health Care’, McGill Law Journal
38.4 (1993), pp. 883–98, at 888.
6 Dworkin, ‘Justice in the Distribution of Health Care’, p. 889.
7 Dworkin, ‘Justice in the Distribution of Health Care’, p. 890.
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Another response to the challenge is to stick with psychophysical235
function as the interpretation of ‘full health’ but to attach additional236
value to treatments that benefit those who are disadvantaged through237
disability.238
Use of such weights would be appropriate were the problem one of a239
failure to move towards equality of outcome.240
For egalitarian reasons it may be appropriate to compromise total241
health gain in order to achieve a fairer distribution of health. But that242
egalitarian question cannot even be posed without a prior assessment243
of what health gain has and could be achieved for different individuals244
using interpersonally comparable units. Calibration of health states245
to respect equality of human worth is required to generate units246
of uniform intrinsic social value. Hence, the problem is a failure247
appropriately to calibrate health gain in a way that respects the equal248
value of lives lived with disability.249
A third possible route to addressing the challenge is to advert to250
elicited societal preferences, using such preferences to overlay QALY251
measurement with societal valuation of QALY gains in different252
circumstances. Peter Ubel and colleagues attempt to address the253
confrontation between the standard approach to QALY measurement254
(described above) with ‘a preference . . . for avoiding discrimination255
against people who have limited treatment potential’ as follows:256
For example, suppose the public thinks that saving the lives of people with257
paraplegia is equally as important as saving the lives of people who can be258
returned to full health . . . . saving the life of either group of patients [would259
then] bring 1 QALY per patient [per year of life extension]. However, this260
rescaling would also force us to conclude that people with paraplegia have the261
same quality of life as people without paraplegia and that curing paraplegia262
would not improve HRQoL. (No HRQoL is gained by ‘improving’ patients from263
an HRQoL of 1.0 to an HRQoL of 1.0.)264
Here is the attempted solution:265
Suppose the societal value of program A [which cures 100 people of a life266
threatening illness returning them to full health] is given an arbitrary value267
of 1.0 [per patient]. Now suppose people think that program B, which saves268
the lives of 100 people [who remain] with paraplegia, should receive the same269
priority for funding as program A . . . Now suppose the same people think that270
curing 600 patients of paraplegia (program C) is equally as important as saving271
100 otherwise healthy people’s lives (program A). Program C therefore has . . .272
a societal value of 0.16 [per patient] . . . .273
What is the benefit of separating societal value from HRQoL measurement? . . .274
the HRQoL brought by programs B and C (in conventional CEA [Cost275
Effectiveness Analysis]) must sum to the number of QALYs brought by program276
A (1 QALY [per person year]). However, . . . the societal value of programs B and277
C add to 1.16 . . . . We can now say that saving the lives of people with paraplegia278
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is equally as valuable as saving other people’s lives while still acknowledging279
that it is beneficial to cure people of paraplegia.8280
The problem with this proposal is that it creates a paradox, which281
the authors half-acknowledge:282
Some may worry that the societal value approach to QALYs is inconsistent283
because it allows the value of programs like B and C to sum to a value >1.284
However, if society places the same value on saving the life of a paraplegic285
and saving the life of a non-paraplegic and if society also values the cure of286
paraplegia, then our suggestion is consistent with societal values.287
The defence does not answer the worry that the advocated approach288
is inconsistent. Consider how it would value a programme D, one that289
was able to save the lives of those with paraplegia threatened by some290
fatal illness and cure their paraplegia at the same time. Programme291
D = B + C in its effect, so should be valued at 1.16 per life year –292
apparently making the programme more valuable than programme A293
(which saved the lives of non-paraplegics), notwithstanding that both294
programmes A and D leave their beneficiaries, who would all otherwise295
die, with exactly the same HRQoL.296
If the Ubel et al. scheme is inconsistent, then that it reflects society’s297
values merely shows society’s values also to be inconsistent. Nord et al.298
suggest that ‘we may be forced to accept [such] inconsistencies rather299
than impose a framework that clearly violates social preferences’.9300
However, it is better to strive for an interpretation of citizens’ expressed301
preferences that is both consistent and free of ethical errors.302
The paradox is dissolved by systematically distinguishing between303
those whose incapacity is irremediable and those whose condition304
is curable, in other words by calibrating health assessment to305
beneficiaries’ varying capacity to benefit.306
II. CALIBRATING TO BEST ATTAINABLE HEALTH STATE307
This section develops ‘A Proposal to Solve the Comparability Problem in308
Cost-Utility Analysis’, by Bleichrodt, Herro and Pinto. They recognize309
that valuation of health states should vary systematically with the310
‘attainable health state’ of each individual:311
The optimal solution . . . is to determine for each individual his set of attainable312
health states and to elicit his health utility function, scaled such that the utility313
of death is equal to zero and the utility of his best attainable health state is314
equal to one. This scaling ensures that a year in the best attainable health315
8 Peter A.Ubel, E.Nord,M.Gold, P.Menzel, J. L. Prades and J. Richardson, ‘Improving
Value Measurement in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis’, Med Care 38 (2000), pp. 892–901.
9 Nord et al., ‘The Value of Life’, p. 875.
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state gets the same weight across individuals and avoids the possibility of316
discrimination due to differences in capacity to benefit.10317
But there is work to be done. First: how do we conceptualize this318
scaling in the presence of uncertainty regarding attainable health319
state? Second, what is attainable depends not only on technology but320
also on budget. Third, taking this approach to avoid discrimination of321
the disabled seems paradoxically to inhibit us from attributing a value322
to possible mitigations of incapacity. And finally, what if those whose323
prospects are very bleak – is individual scaling still appropriate?324
My proposal involves four steps to address these issues:325
(1) calibration to best health prospect (rather than health state),326
(2) respecting the budget constraint of the particular budget holder327
when assessing best health prospect,328
(3) recalibration when changes in technology or budget expand (or329
constrict) the prospects achievable,330
(4) exempting from calibration to best health prospect lives of little331
quality and all consideration of duration.332
(1) Calibrating to personal best health prospect333
When estimating the value of health interventions that shift334
individuals from one prospect to another, calibration to best attainable335
health permits sensitivity to the varying capacity to benefit of different336
individuals. However, as treatment decisions are essentially forward-337
looking, and as health outcomes are probabilistic, it is important that338
calibration is to a best attainable health prospect rather than a best339
attainable health state (a departure from the Bleichrodt et al. proposal).340
We adopt:341
Principle One: calibration to personal best attainable health prospect. In the342
assignment of cardinal values to individuals’ health prospects (Health Related343
Quality of Life HRQoLhp) for each relevant future period for the purpose of344
comparative appraisal of possible interventions, where a prospect is an array345
of possible health states hs each associated with a probability phs such that346
phs =1:347
• the value zero is assigned to the health state of being dead,348
• the value 1 is assigned to the best health prospect achievable by that349
person for that period, where health prospects are ordered according350
to the individuals’ own rational preferences,351
• intermediate values are assigned to a health prospect hp for a period,352
according to individuals’ rational indifference between hp and a353
10 H. Bleichrodt, C. Herrero and J. L. Pinto, ‘A Proposal to Solve the Comparability
Problem in Cost-Utility Analysis’, Journal of Health Economics 21 (2002), pp. 397–403,
at 398.
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prospect involving a probability HRQoLhp of best attainable health354
prospect and a probability (1- HRQoLhp) of death,355
• HRQoLhp is then a coefficient applicable to the duration of the356
affected temporal parts of individuals’ health prospects with/without357
an intervention, thus generating a QALY gain or loss attributable to358
the intervention, e.g. a 0.5 gain in HRQoLhp for a period of a year359
would represent a ½ QALY gain.360
Hence, for somebody with both a remediable and an irremediable361
condition, a best attainable health prospect for that person is defined362
to remedy the remediable but to include the irremediable condition.363
Consider first appraisal of a screening programme to mitigate the364
risk of a life-threatening condition. To avoid discrimination against365
people with disabilities, the assessment of quality of life used in366
calculating incremental QALYs conferred by the screening programme367
must be calibrated to the best health prospect that is available to368
each person affected. The years that are in jeopardy from the life-369
threatening disease are full value years even if they will be enjoyed370
by someone whose maximum gain cannot include sight, no technology371
being available that can restore sight.372
Now, consider the position of a person whose blindness is curable.373
Attainment of sight is attainable for this person, so we should assess374
her options against this standard. Her blindness is not part of her375
endowment but a condition for which she seeks treatment, and hence376
we should calibrate other prospects against a health opportunity set377
that includes a chance of full sight.378
Suppose this second blind person suffers from cataracts that can379
be removed, but the operation has not yet occurred. Suppose she is380
also at risk of developing a life-threatening condition. Is screening her381
to mitigate this risk as valuable as screening a sighted person? Yes,382
but it is less cost-effective, for two procedures are required to achieve383
the same outcome (sight with mitigated risk). The fact that a given384
health prospect for some people involves more cost than for others is385
incontrovertible and should properly inform appraisal.386
(2) Respecting the budget constraint387
Suppose the same scenario arises with a blind person whose blindness388
is technically curable but for whom the budget is not available to cure389
her: perhaps the cure for this person’s type of blindness falls above the390
cost-effectiveness threshold consistent with the budget constraint.391
If the budget constraint is binding, it is just as real a constraint as the392
technological limit. Hence, this person’s life yearswith blindness should393
be attributed intrinsic social value equal to the person whose blindness394
is technically incurable. So, in our example, it should be considered as395
Calibrating QALYs to Respect Equality 11
cost-effective to screen her for a life-threatening condition as to screen396
a sighted person.397
Hence, we must accept:398
Principle Two: maximal individual health prospect is defined with399
reference to any binding budget constraint. In the assessment of the400
maximumhealth prospect achievable by an individual, themaximum401
is defined not only by technological limits but also by the budget402
constraint, assuming that the budget constraint is truly binding.403
Note that the principle that individuals’ best attainable health404
prospects are determined by taking account of the budget constraint405
applies only if the budget constraint is actually binding. If there is406
resource allocated to some other activity which can be reallocated into407
health, then that assumption does not hold, and the allocation between408
that other good and health must be set using some metric of value that409
encompasses both health and whatever good is realized by the other410
budget.411
If a thousand pounds becomes available to the health budget, it412
should be used to fund those interventions that would maximize the413
calibrated QALYs gained. Amongst interventions that only improve414
quality of life without affecting longevity, the best intervention for an415
individual is the one that minimizes the HRQoL that that individual416
would then have reason to assign to their current health prospect.417
Budgetary resources should be displaced from elsewhere just in case418
the social value that they are realizing in that alternative use falls419
short of the social value of the QALYs that would be created by their420
best health use.421
Whose budget constraint should be applied? Budgets are particular422
to budget holders, and budgets are governed by decision-making423
individuals and protocols. The best attainable health prospect for a424
beneficiary will therefore vary with the resources available to the425
decision maker for that use.426
Compare, for example, the relative valuation of different427
interventions carried out by an aid agency to the valuation carried428
out by officers of the impecunious health system that the aid agency429
wishes to support. The latter is forced to take as fixed incapacities that430
from the perspective of a wealthier donor are properly seen as ailments431
requiring cure.432
This gives us:433
Principle Three: The budget constraint that defines beneficiary’s best434
attainable health prospect is that of the current decision-maker.435
Therefore, each funder of health care allocating its budget so as to436
maximize health gain must regard any unaffordable improvement of437
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health condition as an incurable condition not detracting from the438
value of the lives afflicted.439
Decision-making in a publicly funded health service, however, is440
complex: budgets are distributed across many different levels, and the441
hardness of these budget constraints is often not clear. Thismay require442
a decision-maker locally to countenance two conflicting perspectives:443
on the one hand prioritizing locally on the assumption that the budget444
is fixed, on the other making the case for budget expansion from an445
understanding of what health gains could be achieved were the budget446
restraint relaxed.447
(3) Recalibration to best health prospect when changes in technology448
or budget expand (or constrict) the prospects achievable449
Suppose a technology emerges that would allow a particular form of450
blindness to be corrected cost-effectively, the attainable quality of life451
of those suffering from that form of blindness shifts upwards, and452
it is correct to attribute value to the improvement of their lives to453
that higher level. Potential gains of quality of life are thenceforward454
reckoned as a proportion of the attainable quality of life including the455
innovation.456
Yet if the new technology is assessed to be cost-ineffective, the current457
lives of that group continue to be viewed (e.g. in assessing other458
interventions from which they might benefit) as of full quality.459
The appearance of paradox arises because we fail readily to grasp460
the radical shift in the status of the persons affected that occurs if the461
innovation is accepted – from one of disability-demanding-respect to462
one of affliction-demanding-treatment. A member of such a group is463
now unable to realize her potential without intervention, because her464
potential in life has expanded. Existing treatments become inadequate465
to her need.466
We may wish to say that the innovation of an affordable cure was467
there all the time – awaiting discovery, and we merely underestimated468
the potential quality of life of those afflicted by the condition. With469
adoption of the innovation, it turns out that that was the truemaximum470
prospective quality of life. Such an account would explain why we471
attribute value to the discovery itself.472
A similar shift occurs when a budget expansion renders an existing473
treatment affordable – or, in reverse, if a budget contraction forces474
out of the basket of interventions an existing marginally cost-effective475
treatment.476
(4) from calibration to best health prospect lives of little quality and477
all consideration of duration478
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Two objections to the proposal to calibrate quality of life to maximum479
potential function should now be addressed:480
• The implications become counter-intuitivewhen applied to thosewith481
very low potential quality of life.482
• The proposal responds to alleged discrimination against the disabled.483
But the QALY approach to measuring benefit is open to a similar484
objection on behalf of those who have less than average life485
expectancy.486
We will consider each issue in turn.487
Suppose someone is in a permanent vegetative state and the488
possibility emerges to restore to them some minimum level of brain489
function still short of consciousness. To the extent that that represents490
the maximum function that can be attained for such a person, it might491
seem to follow from the equality of persons that such an intervention492
should be reckoned as if it were conferring full quality of life.493
To avoid this outcome, we could stipulate a minimum level of mental494
function as delimiting the ambit of the principle of equality. Social value495
might be thought to inhere in the existence or the doings of ethical496
persons, and there is philosophical space to deny ethical personhood to497
those lacking basic mental function. Whilst there may be separate and498
powerful ethical reasons to attribute value to the lives of the comatose,499
the demented and to tiny infants in most contexts, conditionality upon500
personhood shields from absurdity the proposal to calibrate maximum501
HRQoL level to the individual’s best attainable health prospect when502
appraising interventions.503
Conditionality upon personhood is in turn supported by a minimal504
substantive understanding of what gives life its equal potential value.505
To avoid conditioning valuation upon one particular theory of life’s506
value, calibration for equality aims to value improved psychophysical507
function according to the importance that individuals themselveswould508
attribute to it. (Calibrating against an average citizens’ assessment, by509
contrast, would implicitly ignore the potential of someone with some510
disability to find a distinctive yet equally valuable use for the time511
that they have available to them.) There is nevertheless a minimum512
level of functioning beneath which neither experiences nor activities of513
value are conceivable. The permanently comatose are capable of neither514
experiences nor activities of intrinsic value.515
A more demanding minimum is set by Nord et al. in qualifying the516
Equal Value of Life proposal mentioned in section I: ‘To resolve the517
issue, we have suggested that all life years gained by disabled people518
should count as 1 as long as the health state in question is preferred to519
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being dead by those concerned.’11 In some communities where a suicide520
wish is reckoned reasonable (rather than the product of a distress that521
observers may hope will prove temporary), intervention to prevent it is522
not thought appropriate. It is no doubtwith such situations inmind that523
Nord et al. proposed the limitation to their EVL rule. The important524
point here however is that some lower limit is plausibly consistent with525
the principle of equality.526
In section III, intuitions regarding our proposal at this difficult527
borderline are tested against an example.528
Regarding the second issue, are we bound by the principle of equality529
also to calibrate potential gain in years of life to themaximum potential530
years of life available to each person?531
Though such calibration would be technically feasible, the results532
would be strikingly counterintuitive.533
Suppose of two patients facing a small risk of death, small enough534
that this is not a risk from which rescue is demanded (given that rescue535
creates its own ethical demands), the life expectancy of one of the536
patients is dramatically shorter: she has only a day or two to live before537
she will die from a pre-existing condition. It is apparent that an inter-538
vention to reduce the small risk of immediate death is more valuable539
for the person with greater life expectancy. And the reason is this: the540
capacity for experiences and activities of value is broadly proportionate541
to time; the doctrine of equality thus lacks plausibility over this dimen-542
sion. Whether there is strict proportionality between time granted and543
value of life is less obvious, as we will discuss in the next section.544
III. THE ROLE OF QALYS IN SOCIAL DECISION-MAKING545
QALYs play a particular role in social decision-making: they represent546
units of impact that bear constant intrinsic social value, such that547
when appraising different options, an option yielding twice as many548
QALYs will yield twice as much intrinsic social value. In this section I549
first focus upon the theoretical requirements for value-homogeneity of550
the QALY metric. I then test the proposal against intuitions regarding551
minimal quality of life and the displacement of treatments delivering552
higher relative quality of life.553
As Sen points out, to allow interpersonal comparisons of levels and554
of increments, achievement of social value must be susceptible to555
measurement for each individual on a ratio scale, and the origin of556
the scale must be non-arbitrary.12557
11 Nord et al., ‘The Value of Life’, p. 873.
12 A. Sen, ‘Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare’, essay 12 in Choice, Welfare and
Measurement (Cambridge, MA, 1982), see particularly sec. 4, ‘Comparability Types:
Formal Structures’.
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Sen suggests a possible zero: ‘The interpretation [of ‘the “origin”558
of a person’s welfare function’] may be to identify a distinguished559
point below which misery dominates . . . ’. He notes however that ‘other560
interpretations are possible’. It is natural to identify this ‘origin’ with561
the zero point on the HRQoL scale described in section I. This zero is562
commonly associated with ‘death’ rather than with ‘misery’, but death563
is actually inappropriate as an interpretation, being an event rather564
than a state, and irreversible. Sen’s ‘misery’ suggestion may be more565
helpful, understood, under the SG methodology, as a level of pain or566
other affliction such that there is no risk of death a person would be567
unwilling to accept to recover from a prospect in which that state is568
endured indefinitely.569
In order to discharge a commitment to the equality of human worth,570
the intrinsic social value attributed to any individual’s welfare should571
also be scaled to a commonmaximum value for any given duration. (Re-572
garding amaximum, Sen refers briefly to the possibility of prohibiting a573
set of welfare functions for interpersonal comparisons ‘that “blows up”574
the welfare function of one person arbitrarily keeping those of others575
unchanged’.) This ceiling on the intrinsic social value of individual576
welfare can be identified with the ceiling on the HRQoL scale, HRQoL577
= 1, attributable to any individual’s best attainable life prospect.578
It might be objected that even a person enjoying their best attainable579
health prospect may yet lack adequate resources to flourish. Neverthe-580
less, we can call in aid the point established in section II that calibration581
to maximum potential is relative to what is achievable by the budget-582
holder conducting an appraisal, and is thus subject to the resources at583
their disposal. For the allocator of healthcare resources, the allocation584
of other resources is taken as a given, so for that budget holder there585
is an equivalence between HRQoL and Quality of Life tout court.586
Indeed, this approach is not limited to healthcare decision-making.587
The methodology outlined in sections I and II makes no essential588
reference to health: for decision-makers with other interventions in589
their portfolio, health states, health prospects and attainable health590
states can be displaced bymore general concepts of welfare. Individuals’591
conceptions of what lends value to their lives, whether health or592
education or other goods, are incorporated into the methodology for593
assigning quality of life levels to different life states and life prospects594
relative to best attainable life prospect.595
Sen, in his championing of an ethically broad-based measure of596
success in social policy, focuses upon ‘individual capabilities to do things597
that a person has reason to value’.13 At least without fitting to it the598
13 A. Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford, 1999), p. 56.
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formal restrictions suggested above, the capability approach is open to599
an elitist interpretation, one that values the societal sum of capability600
calculated employing absolute measures of functioning. To insist on a601
maximum level of capability that is attainable is to deny the validity602
of perfectionist accounts of human worth. Notwithstanding that we603
may be confident that Jack will flourish less than Jill upon any and604
every objective scale, we take it as axiomatic that the social value605
of enabling Jack to flourish as much as he possibly can for a year606
is of no less value than doing the same for Jill. This is interestingly607
consistent with Jack actually wasting what opportunity he is given.608
The principle of equality applies in prospect not in retrospect – but the609
decision contexts withwhichwe are dealing do not require retrospective610
comparison.14611
This proposal is not to be understood as a compromise to meet612
egalitarian or fairness concerns, for we lack an alternative ethically613
tolerable metric of interpersonal value comparison. Rather it is614
intrinsic to our understanding of value that the social value of any615
individual’s life prospect is of no more value, year for year, than any616
other’s. To respect this intuition regarding valuation we therefore insist617
on calibratingwelfare against a scale that not only has a significant zero618
but also has a significant maximum, set at the individual’s maximum619
achievable and affordable welfare prospect.620
The social value of welfare must be measured in units that have a621
time dimension as well as a magnitude at a time. Elsewhere I have622
argued that a year’s gain in life expectancy (a statistical life year) is623
an attractive interpersonally comparable measure of roughly constant624
intrinsic social value, notwithstanding that the lives vary in longevity.15625
But to use theQALY as ameasure of homogeneous intrinsic social value626
is to assign equal value to each of a person’s prospective life years at best627
attainable health, as well as equal value to the life years of different628
people.629
Assessing aggregate value by integrating over duration is630
inconsistent with John Broome’s contention that time is not separable631
in the social value function.16 However, separability of times, like632
separability of persons (for which Broome argues), is a simplification633
that may be adequate to certain decision contexts, though not to634
others. Broome is correct that it is not adequate to a context in635
which decisions are being taken that might affect the age structure636
of a whole community. For other questions, perhaps dealing with637
14 Donald Franklin, Groups in Conflict: Equality versus Community (Cardiff, 2008),
see particularly ch. 1: ‘The Doctrine of Equal Human Worth’, pp. 20-9.
15 Donald Franklin, ‘Valuing the Time of Your Life’ (under review).
16 John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford, 2004), ch. 7.
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sustaining communal institutions such as the family, separation of638
persons will also be inadequate. Nevertheless, for social decision-639
making in the contexts here under consideration (the allocation of640
healthcare resources, and similar goods and services affecting the641
quality of the lives of existing groups), a reasonable simplification is642
to extend equal concern to each period of a person’s life.643
Let us now test this proposal against challenging scenarios involving644
lives whose maximum health prospect even with best treatment is of645
low quality, and whose treatment will displace that of individuals with646
better prospects.647
Imagine a condition that leaves its sufferers fully conscious, but in648
a very poor physical condition. Suppose that this condition is rated649
as preferable to being dead (or that the choice of being dead in this650
community is not available). Now a treatment becomes available that651
would improve quality of life to a very small, but real, degree, but652
only at such an expense that it would only be reckoned affordable653
if the improvement were calibrated in the way discussed such that654
the improved state is deemed full health for this group (HRQoL = 1).655
To fund such treatment might displace treatments from others whose656
quality of life would be much higher subsequent to treatment at only657
slightly higher cost per year of benefit. Can funding the treatment658
nonetheless be justified?659
For example, suppose the condition leaves sufferers in almost660
constant severe pain – but with regular remissions of average661
duration of fifteen minutes per day. Suppose the proposed treatment662
could increase the period of remission to one hour. Suppose that663
a conventional assignment of HRQoL levels to these two health664
prospects – respectively without and with the treatment to extend665
remission periods – would generate assignments of 0.025 and 0.1666
(assuming for simplicity proportionality of life value with time in667
remission). That is to say that a representative sample of the general668
public would be willing to take a 97.5 per cent risk of death to avoid the669
untreated prospect if the alternative were full psychophysical health,670
and that they would be willing to take a 90 per cent risk of death to671
avoid even the with-treatment prospect (to use the Standard Gamble672
interpretation of the assignment of health prospects to HRQoL levels673
described in section I).674
Four years with this condition would conventionally generate only675
one tenth of aQALY (0.025× 4= 0.1), and the treatmentwould raise the676
tally to 0.4 QALY (0.1 × 4 = 0.4) – a gain of 0.3 QALY. With calibration,677
however, we would scale to the maximum achievable quality of life for678
this group – which is the prospect with the treatment. To those with679
this condition, suppose we elicit a willingness to take a risk of death of680
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75 per cent to get the benefit of the treatment and to avoid the prospect681
of remissions remaining at only fifteen minutes per day. From which682
we infer that, from the perspective of this group, the treatment raises683
HRQoL from 0.25 to 1, generating ¾ QALY each year, three QALYs684
over four years.685
Under the calibration-for-equality proposal, therefore, this treatment686
would be judged affordable in preference to one of equal per capita687
cost that generated an expected additional thirty-five months in full688
psychophysical health to some other group, e.g. through mitigation of689
a lethal heart condition.690
Is it reasonable to attribute such a high value to a treatment that691
leaves sufferers in such a miserable condition?692
Note first, remembering Dworkin’s insurance proposal, that if the693
chronic pain condition is merely one to which the general population694
is at risk, alongside the risk of heart disease, and the choice is which695
treatment to fund, then calibration is not appropriate. In that case,696
each member of the population is trading between risks of different697
outcomes, and each would rationally maximize uncalibrated QALYs in698
so doing.699
Rather, we are envisaging that known sufferers of the chronic pain700
condition (like those who are blind from birth in the earlier examples)701
are members of the population for whom the basket of services is being702
chosen. (Whether this is appropriate for a particular condition may703
depend upon the age of incidence – a issue touched upon in section IV.)704
Their perspective with the condition is the one that is pertinent to the705
community’s choice of service basket: there is no legitimate argument706
based upon what choices they would have made from a full health707
perspective had they been merely at risk of the condition that they708
now irremediably have. They cannot be bound by such hypothetical709
choices.710
As this is a question of interpersonal comparisons rather than711
of risk optimization for a single set of people, the group with this712
condition can invoke the equal value of human life in defending713
their claim to have the health gain on offer recalibrated to their714
maximum health prospect. If the intuition of equality is challenged715
by this example – attributing as it does equal value to a year with716
chronic severe pain only remitted for an hour a day and that of a717
year with no disability – the burden of proof is on those who would718
salvage some coherent account of a commitment to the equality of719
human life. Alternatively, the objector would have to abandon that720
principle, and then presumably countenance differentiation of the721
intrinsic value of life across all dimensions of function (intelligence,722
strength of interpersonal relationships, happiness of disposition inter723
alia).724
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It is clear that the proposed calibration of comparative health725
impact on different people conflicts with our unreflective judgement726
of comparative value of different health states – as these will727
unreflectively be based on an intrapersonal comparison.728
For example, recall from section I that in the discussion of the729
Dworkin insurance model we considered treatments respectively for730
heart and for cancer patients, the heart treatment yielding fourteen731
untroubled years, the cancer treatment delivering fifteen years marred732
by significant pain and disability. We saw that so long as we are733
ignorant as to which group cancer risks apply, and to which group734
heart risks apply, then appraisal is for the general population. In735
which case, interpersonal comparisons of value are not involved736
and calibration for equality is not required, so the heart treatment737
can be selected for the basket of treatments. If, however, the two738
groups are distinct, calibration for equality requires us to view the739
best health prospect for each group to be of equal intrinsic value740
year by year, and the cancer treatment must be selected (at least741
if they involve equal total cost per person). This outcome may742
seem counterintuitive, perhaps because we slide between the two743
cases.744
To press the point, suppose there are two separate groups of745
individuals, A and B, who are at equal risk of contracting respectively746
condition A and condition B, and all who contract these conditions747
would die with no treatment. (Again, it is important that these are two748
separate groups; if all were at risk of either disease, then intrapersonal749
comparative valuation would yield answers without the need for750
calibration.) Suppose for those who contract condition A treatment A1,751
which gives health state hs1 for one year, is preferred to treatment752
A2, which gives health state hs2 for three years, given the difficulties753
implicit in the latter state. The only available treatment for condition754
B is treatment B, which gives health state hs1, for two years. Given755
that hsB is the maximal health state for condition B sufferers, it must756
be assigned a HRQoL score of 1. If resource is available only to treat757
those at risk of condition A or those at risk of condition B, but not758
both, and treatment costs and other relevant impacts are the same,759
treatment A2 would be socially preferred to treatment B, as it yields760
three years to every beneficiary whereas treatment B yields only two761
years. As A1 yields only one year, were it taken to displace treatment762
A2 from the social reckoning (given that it is preferred by A), treatment763
B would be chosen. Yet, the potential for three years of life for group A764
is what is normative for the social decision-maker comparing the two765
treatments, notwithstanding that the outturn (given that group A will766
actually opt for treatment A1) will be fewer years in the same health-767
state than would have been achieved for group B. Whilst longevity768
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may be sacrificed for quality of life by individuals in group A with769
respect to their own lives, social cost-benefit analysis is constrained770
not to make such sacrifices interpersonally. Where there are different771
population groups for whom outcomes are being compared, calibration772
to maximum health prospect is required.773
Perhaps this corollary of the principle of equality remains774
counterintuitive. The analogy with dexterity or height or intelligence775
or pulchritude or happiness of disposition may help to render this776
approach natural. These attributes are generally valued as goods in777
contexts in which we assess how much human beings can contribute to778
others’ lives (for example in recruitment for employment or selecting779
members for a sports team or a musical ensemble), or when seeking780
to avoid hazards that might jeopardize our capabilities in these781
dimensions, or in the exceptional cases where a deficit can be remedied782
(by a growth hormone, or by therapy of some sort, or by surgery). But for783
the most part, we accept that we are endowed with different levels of784
these attributes, and that that is our lot, without these differences785
rendering us less or more valuable intrinsically as human beings.786
Hence, when assessing relative effectiveness of health interventions,787
these differences are irrelevant. Irremediable health conditions should788
be treated likewise.789
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF790
HEALTH ECONOMICS791
What difference should this proposal make in the practice of health792
economics?793
Calibration to maximum health prospect ought in principle to have794
wide application: given the high incidence of multiple morbidity,795
treatments will often benefit large numbers of individuals with796
a range of other pre-existing conditions or disabilities; without797
calibration, the benefit of treatments for such individuals would be798
reckoned to fall short of benefits to otherwise healthy and able-bodied799
individuals.800
In practice, however, health economics valuations are usually801
valuations of treatments, and appraisals of treatments generally802
assume that the target group is homogeneous. If a treatment is803
approved, it will be approved for a population, and ethical and legal804
norms governing the clinical context will prevent any discrimination805
against the disabled in authorizing or funding the treatment, whilst806
clinicians determining to whom to apply these treatments are sheltered807
from the direct application of cost-utility analysis. (Co-morbidities are808
taken into account but only to the extent that they raise risk of adverse809
outcomes or reduce likelihood of recovery.)810
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Calibration to maximum health prospect as here proposed is811
therefore achieved simply by not making any explicit adjustments for812
individuals with co-morbidities or disabilities notwithstanding their813
lower achievable health prospect. For example, where a treatment814
offers a full cure for a disease, it is normally implicitly assumed that815
all individuals who benefit from the treatment will be returned to full816
health, notwithstanding that some individuals who benefit from the817
treatment will have other conditions or disabilities that affect their818
health (so that ‘full health’ is effectively understood as ‘maximum819
health prospect’).820
Hence, our proposal can be seen primarily as a principled justification821
of current practice. It implies that it would not only be a breach of822
clinical ethics to discriminate against the irremediably blind person823
in authorizing a risk-mitigating treatment, it would also be a mistake824
from a cost-effectiveness perspective, even if it were only marginally825
cost-effective.826
The implications of the methodology are less straightforward for827
treatments whose principal beneficiaries are those who have fallen828
victim to a progressive disease that limits maximal psychophysical829
function, and for the elderly. ThemeasuredQALY impact, and hence the830
assessed value for money, of interventions to slow illness progression is831
systematically reduced if potential health gain is assessed relative to a832
general population conception of full health, as is standard practice.833
Whether this is discriminatory depends upon the perspective834
employed: whether we seek to maximize outcomes for the currently-835
healthy at-risk population (as in a Dworkin insurance model) or836
whether those currently suffering from such conditions should be837
considered part of the population for whom the basket of services838
covered by health services is being chosen.839
For example, suppose we do take the view that it is the valuation840
of diabetics rather than those merely at risk of diabetes that should841
be authoritative in assessing an intervention to reduce risk of adverse842
sequelae. In that case, the importance of avoiding a particular adverse843
outcome – like blindness – is assessed for its estimated particular844
impact proportioned to the realistic health aspirations of those with845
diabetes (rather than relative to some standard characterization of full846
health). Standard assignments of HRQoL level to health prospect, i.e.847
those based upon responses from surveys where respondents assume848
no fixed limit to achievable psychophysical function,17 would have849
17 E.g. P. Dolan, C. Gudex, P. Kind and A. Williams, ‘A Social Tariff for EuroQoL:
Results from a UK General Population Survey’, University of York: Centre for Health
Economics, 1995, Discussion Paper 138.
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to be recalibrated for application to a population with maximum850
health prospect involving irremediable disability. Thus if a treatment is851
under consideration for a population whose maximum health prospect852
would be assigned a HRQoL level of m for those without irremediable853
disability, then all other prospects with a standard assignment of l, less854
than m, should be scaled up to l/m. (For example, a prospect standardly855
assigned a level of 0.2 would be rated at 0.5 for a population whose856
maximum possible health prospect would be rated for the population857
without irremediable disability at only 0.4.)858
The same dilemma regarding perspective arises with much more859
general application in considering treatments that particularly benefit860
the elderly. Health economics valuations of treatments are sometimes861
reduced on account of the lower average self-reported health-related862
quality of life scores of the elderly, notwithstanding that these lower863
scores are unavoidable. (This discount is applied to the fewer life years864
that are inevitably attributable to treatments benefiting older people.)865
The methodology proposed could be used to avoid such diminished866
valuation of additional years and increased health relative tomaximum867
health prospect for the elderly as for all those with incapacities868
unrelated to the condition targeted by the intervention being appraised.869
Whether it is appropriate thus to calibrate elder life years to870
best attainable health prospect depends upon whether we can adopt871
the Dworkin insurance model for this group. To do so would allow872
consideration of disabilities associated with age to be weighed by each873
potential beneficiary of health services ‘looking from youth down the874
course of their lives and trying to decide what risks were worth running875
in return for not running other kinds of risks’.876
It is at least arguable that older citizens would hope that their877
diminished average level of health would not be allowed to compromise878
valuation of the prospective health treatments from which they might879
benefit, and that they might deny the relevance of the insurance880
argument. Evidently the timing of the selection of treatments for the881
insurance basket relative to the life course of members of society, and882
the temporal scope of decision, are relevant when determining which883
infirmities are to be considered known. Perhaps the constituency whose884
welfare is at issue should be defined by a planning horizon for the885
decisions to be made. If any who might benefit are currently suffering,886
then their perspective, alongside those merely at risk, would at least887
be relevant.888
It is a subtle point in political economy and in social contract theory889
requiring debate and further work whether the participants in the890
contract are to be considered all to be in their youth as Dworkin891
seems to suggest; or whether we envisage some broader constituency,892
and if so how to integrate competing perspectives regarding the same893
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intervention. However, what is clear, or so I have argued, is that894
respecting equality of human worth requires calibration of welfare895
impacts for all those for whom social decisions are being taken to their896
best attainable welfare prospect however limited that may be; to do897
otherwise is to denigrate their intrinsic life-value.18898
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